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Abstract 
Taxation as an instrument for environmental policy (green taxes) has been a topic of heated 
debate in Norway for almost 30 years. The subject of environmental taxes has time after 
time inflamed both policymakers and scholars alike. The suitability of green taxes as a 
policy instrument was first discussed in the 1970s. The 1980s introduced the idea that 
income from green taxes would make reductions in other taxes possible: a green tax 
reform. In the 1990s, the tax discussion boiled down to whether or not all polluters should 
face the same carbon tax. Lately, however, the discussion around the Kyoto Protocol has 
led to increased interest around the alternative of introducing a system of tradable emission 
quotas. Environmental taxation might thus be a declining policy instrument in Norway. 
This is contrary to recent developments in several other European countries such as the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. This paper explores why the idea of a 
green tax reform never got off the ground in Norway by providing an overview of 
Norwegian environmental policy in the period from 1972 to early 2000.  
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1 Environmental taxes on the agenda 
Environmental policy made its first serious appearance on the political agenda in Norway 
about the time the UN Conference on the Human Environment took place in Stockholm 
in 1972. The negative impact of industrialization on the natural environment was becoming 
more and more visible, and the issue of pollution was becoming a matter of public 
concern. The need for further policy regulation became apparent, thus the Ministry of the 
Environment was established in 1972, and the State Pollution Control Authority (SFT) was 
established in 1974. Since that time, these two institutions have gradually become the major 
policy-making authorities in the area of environmental policy. 
At the Stockholm meeting, the “polluter pays principle” was introduced on the 
international political agenda. It received broad international support but made little impact 
on practical policy before the mid-1980s. The most common interpretation of the principle 
is that the polluter should be held liable for damages caused by pollutants. 
The introduction of the polluter pays principle into Norwegian politics voiced the 
concept of using environmental taxes to achieve environmental benefits. There was 
nevertheless no political consensus on whether taxes were a suitable environmental policy 
instrument. This was in spite of the considerable amount of research conducted by the 
government, in cooperation with among others the Department of Economics at the 
University of Oslo and Statistics Norway, and the effort to analyze the benefits and 
disadvantages of taxes. Environmental taxation was evaluated against direct regulations and 
subsidization.1 The recommendations of the succeeding governmental reports (Report. no. 
71, 1972–73, and The long-term program of the cabinet 1974–1977) were in favor of 
environmental taxes because they point directly to the causes of pollution, and also because 
they would give the industry incentives to develop environmental technology.   
Environmental taxes have the potential to result in a cost-effective outcome, i.e. 
meeting political goals at the lowest possible social cost: It is in each producer’s own 
interest to equate his marginal abatement cost to the emission tax. As long as all producers 
face the same emission tax, marginal abatement costs will be equalized across sources (see, 
e.g., Hoel 1997). However, cost effectiveness requires that emissions are verifiable and that 
the rate of taxation is socioeconomically correct. Due to constraints on information, it is 
difficult to determine the optimal rate of taxation. Thus, goal attainment becomes 
uncertain. Prior to implementation it is difficult to establish to what extent emissions will 
be reduced at a given rate of taxation, i.e. uncertain control effectiveness. If a country is 
committed by an international agreement to reduce emissions by a certain percentage, this 
can be a disadvantage. In the search of the socially optimal level of taxation, the 
government will have to use a method of trial and error. During this process, business and 
industry will have fluctuating operating conditions from year to year, which they may view 
as a disadvantage.  
                                           
1 Subsidization can function as an environmental policy measure when used by the government to regulate 
the behavior of polluters, especially large stationary sources of pollution. 
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The lack of political consensus on taxation in the 1970s was apparent even between 
the ministries. The environmental authorities were loyal to direct regulation instruments 
because they were thought to be more control effective. The Ministry of Finance, however, 
favored taxation. In general, the debate about policy instruments became a tug of war 
between the Ministry of Environment, which controlled direct regulations, and the Ministry 
of Finance, which made adjustments in the tax system (Asdal 1998). This conflict reflects a 
game of power between the two ministries. The Ministry of Finance traditionally had 
almost complete control over economic policy issues, whereas the new Ministry of 
Environment was trying to position itself as a forceful player in the environmental policy 
arena. 
The environmental non-governmental organizations’ (ENGOs) participation in the 
framing of abatement policy was negligible. Business and industry on the other hand had 
already established an increasingly strong and well-organized lobby. In contrast to ENGOs, 
business and industry were represented in all committees that worked on this issue in the 
1960s and 1970s (Reitan, 1998). One explanation for this lack of engagement could be that 
the ENGOs believed their interests to be represented by the Ministry of Environment. 
Nevertheless, policy was formed largely on the premises of business and industry. 
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2 Stabilization policy 
In the governmental debate about various policy instruments, great emphasis was put on 
keeping Norwegian business and industry competitive in the international market. Green 
taxes enforced in Norway alone were considered to be too much of a competitive 
disadvantage for the export industry sector. Few other countries had adopted an 
environmental taxation regime at this time. Some, including Sweden, had even introduced 
economic subsidization schemes. Influenced by this, the Norwegian government also 
chose subsidies as their main policy instrument to regulate industry behavior (Reitan, 1998), 
despite the clear recommendations of green taxes by various governmental agency reports.  
To a great extent regional policy motivations, rather than environmental ones, 
governed the choice of policy measures. There is a strong political tradition in Norway of 
supporting and subsidizing a broadest possible residential and employment pattern in every 
part of the country. Therefore, the subsidies were to a great extent directed at cornerstone 
industries in small societies in sparsely populated areas.  
Another probable causal factor for the introduction of subsidization schemes is the 
post-World War II development of a social-market economy, with a careful blend of 
market capitalism, strong labor protection and a generous welfare state. In line with this 
tradition of strong governmental control over the economy, it was natural for the 
government to assume most of the responsibility for cleaning up industrial pollution. In 
fact, the pollution control policy became a part of the economic stabilization policy in the 
mid-1970s. With respect to the polluter pays principle, however, this implied an indirect 
subsidization of polluting activities. 
The faith in stabilization policy was eventually weakened, and in 1977–1978 the 
government chose a new line. The Ministry of Finance depicted environmental protection 
and employment concerns as competing interests, and pointed out that the Labor 
government had high employment rates as their main objective. Increasing attention was 
paid to the balance of trade as well as the international competitiveness of export 
industries. Environmental concerns were not considered a priority for the Ministry of 
Finance until well into the 1980s. At this time, Norway had to comply with a number of 
international agreements, such as the 1985 protocol on the reduction of sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) emissions (LRTAP). This forced the Ministry of Finance to consider environmental 
concerns when designing policy.  
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3 The Brundtland Report 
The Brundtland Report2, Our Common Future, was published in April 1987 and had a 
significant impact on the political agenda. For example, the then minister of environment, 
Sissel Rønbeck, addressed the Norwegian parliament (Stortinget) in May 1987 and gave a 
statement on environmental policy. It was the first time such a comprehensive presentation 
of environmental policy was given in parliament. 
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report and 
its arguments and points of emphasis brought several subjects to the forefront. For 
instance the WCED argued for the need of redefining the concept of “growth” to also 
include environmental as well as developmental concerns (Lafferty et al., 1997). In line with 
WCED’s recommendations, the Labor Party (Ap) government introduced additional 
environmental taxes in the national budget for that same year (Tenfjord, 1995). This 
included taxes on lubricating oil and environmentally harmful batteries. 
The 1989 cabinet report on a long-term program further developed the idea that 
environmental taxes would give producers and consumers incentives to behave in a more 
environmentally sound manner. But it was also emphasized that environmental taxes had 
to be seen in relation to other price and tax policies. Income from the environmental taxes 
was supposed to form the foundation for a reduction in other taxes and at the same time 
favorably affect the pattern of consumption and production (Report. no. 4, 1988-89). This 
was how environmental taxes were expected to contribute to more effective usage of 
resources.  
                                           
2 The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
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4 The “Environmental Election” 
The environment was, as in many other Northern European countries, at the top of the 
agenda in the public debate of the late 1980s. The Norwegian parliamentary elections in 
1989 were dubbed “the environmental election ‘89” by the press, which argued that 
environmental issues would swing many voters. A united political community spoke 
warmly about the necessity of introducing new and more specifically targeted 
environmental taxes. 
The new government was a coalition formed by the Conservative Party (H), the 
Christian Democratic Party (KrF) and the Center Party (Sp). In his inaugural address, 
Prime Minister Syse declared that his government would give priority to the fight against 
pollution. Through greater use of environmental taxes, the government would make 
environmentally sound behavior profitable both from a private and a social point of view. 
The government also promised to quicken the pace of environmental policy, and to hurry 
the work with a plan for the use of environmental taxes, as requested by the parliament 
(Aftenposten news archives, 1989). Thus, the government commissioned an environmental 
tax committee and instructed it to report to the parliament in 1992. The committee 
comprised members from the relevant ministries (Finance, Transport and 
Communications, Environment, Industry, and Oil and Energy) as well as members from 
the research community (Statistics Norway, the University of Oslo, and the Norwegian 
Petroleum Institute). The committee’s mandate was to submit a total overview and plan for 
how the use of environmental taxes was to be incorporated into environmental policy. 
A year after taking office, the government submitted a proposal to introduce 
carbon taxes on gasoline and mineral oil, in connection with the 1991 parliamentary 
negotiations on the national budget. After the Labor Party (Ap) regained power that same 
fall, a new proposal was submitted to expand the carbon tax to apply to the petroleum 
industry as well. This was intended to be the policy that would ensure the parliament’s 
ability to attain the very ambitious goal set in 1989: to stabilize the Norwegian emissions of 
CO2 at a 1989 level by the year 2000 (Tenfjord, 1995). A further expansion of the carbon 
tax would be considered in the light of the forthcoming report from the environmental tax 
committee. 
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5 Mobilization of interests 
Powerful actors in Norwegian society saw their interests being threatened as it became 
clear that the costs of introducing environmental taxes would be high for them. For 
instance, political actors representing regional interests and the automobile lobby reacted to 
the further increase in gasoline prices. Norway spans a relatively long distance and has large 
uninhabited areas. The considerable distances between regions leads to high costs of 
transportation. Since more transportation is required in the more sparsely populated 
regions and remote northern regions, transportation costs here are naturally higher. This 
differentiation in transportation costs implies a potential for conflicts between these 
regions and the southern regions where 2/3 of the population lives. The oil industry also 
joined the protest bandwagon after the Labor Party expanded the carbon tax to affect 
offshore activities.  
Nevertheless, the strongest reactions came from the petrochemical industry and the 
process industry, even though these sectors had not yet been taxed. CO2 emissions are an 
inevitable consequence of the production process in the ferro-alloy and aluminum 
industries. A reduction in emissions would necessarily mean lower production or 
investments in new technology. Maintenance of jobs in cornerstone industries thus became 
one of the main arguments in the industry’s lobby against taxes. Another key argument was 
concern regarding international competitiveness. The Confederation of Norwegian 
Business and Industry (NHO), a powerful lobby in Norwegian politics, argued that taxes 
should only be introduced as a result of international cooperation (Dagens Næringsliv news 
archives, 1991). 
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6 Environmental Tax Committee 
In February 1992, the environmental tax committee released its report “Towards a more 
cost-effective environmental policy in the 1990s”. The report ascertained it was just during 
the last couple of years that “taxes were implemented with the explicit purpose of affecting 
consumption and the use of production factors through an improved socioeconomic 
pricing of the environment.” (NOU 1992:3, author’s translation). It further concluded that 
the taxation system at that time deviated significantly from the criteria of cost-effectiveness. 
The report pointed out that a total of 40 percent of the CO2 emissions and 60 percent of 
the SO2 emissions were exempted from taxation. The committee raised the important point 
that the principle of cost-effectiveness dictates that all sectors should be subjected to the 
same rate of taxation (across-the-board taxation). 
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Figure 1: Norwegian CO2 taxes adjusted for inflation. 
 
The report states: “The purpose of environmental taxes is to contribute to an 
improved resource use. It is thus important to see improved pricing of the environment as 
an integrated part of a comprehensive policy for growth, more effective use of resources in 
the Norwegian economy, and a gradual changing of economic systems in a more 
environmentally sound direction.” (NOU 1992:3, author’s translation). 
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7 Green Tax Commission 
In the fall of 1994, on the recommendation of the environmental tax committee, the 
parliamentary majority decided to establish a commission to look more closely at how 
different kinds of taxation regimes could achieve both an improved environment and high 
rates of employment. 
The proposal to establish a green tax commission received a majority vote as a 
result of bargaining between the Socialist Left Party (SV) and the Labor Party (Ap). During 
the parliamentary committee of finances’ preparation of the 1994 budget, the Labor Party 
barely succeeded in passing its tax scheme. In return they had to support the Socialist Left 
Party’s proposal to establish a green tax commission (Aftenposten news archives, 1994). The 
commission was composed of representatives from the relevant ministries, research 
communities, the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions (LO), the Confederation of 
Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO), some major industrial corporations, and 
ENGOs. 
The mandate of the commission was to look at “how the interests of both 
increased employment and an improved environment can be protected by shifting the 
burden of taxation from employment to activities that imply increased use of resources and 
increased pollution.” (NOU 1996:9, author’s translation) In other words, the commission 
was to look into the possibilities of a shift from red to green taxes (see below).  
The current tax system was formed primarily during a time when environmental 
concerns were given less weight, at the same time as reorganization and structural problems 
in the job market were less serious than they are today. Red taxes function purely as 
income sources for the government. The traditional taxes on labor, which is a substantial 
part of today’s tax system, are examples of red taxes. A shift to green taxes would be 
achieved by increasing environmental taxation and simultaneously reducing other taxes and 
duties. If this is done in a such way that the public income remains the same, the tax 
reform is said to be revenue neutral. In recent years, there has been a focus on attaining 
double dividends by implementing such tax shifts. For example, a shift in taxation from 
labor to environmentally harmful activities can, over time, contribute to a sustainable 
development and an industry structure with high levels of employment (see, e.g.,  Hoel 
1997). 
During the Green Tax Commission’s period of work, it became clear that export 
industries were skeptical to a green tax reform. The industry feared that the desired increase 
in employment would not occur, and that profitability from production would also 
decrease. The increased unemployment that marked the Norwegian society strongly in the 
1980s was still fresh in the collective mind. In addition, they maintained that the increased 
taxes would lead to moving economically important, but pollution intensive, industry out 
of Norway (Dagens Næringsliv news archives, 1995). This again would lead to an increase in 
airborne emissions because other countries use coal-fired plants to produce energy instead 
of hydropower. Global emissions would therefore increase, they argued. The export 
industries instead proposed voluntary agreements with the decision-makers.  
Just prior to the publication of the commission’s report in June 1996, it became 
known that there was substantial internal disagreement. In large part, the disagreement was 
CICERO Report 2000:6 
From taxes to permits? The Norwegian climate policy debate 
 
 
9 
about whether or not one should tax the carbon emissions from industry exempted from 
taxation. The minority in the commission—comprising NHO, LO, Norsk Hydro, and the 
Ministry of Industry and Energy—wanted voluntary agreements. The majority, however, 
were in favor of introducing a carbon tax of NOK 50 per metric ton of emissions in return 
for a reduction in employers’ social security contributions of 0.7 percent. 
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Figure 2: Environmental taxes measured in billions 1998 Norwegian kroner and in percent 
of the government’s total taxes and duties 1990–2000. Sources: Ministry of Finance, 
Proposal no. 54 to the Storting (1997–98), and Proposal no. 1 (1999-2000). The numbers for 
2000 are estimates. 
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8 Internal disagreement 
At the last meeting of the Green Tax Commission, in May 1996, representatives from the 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Transport and Communications, and the Ministry of the 
Environment surprisingly withdrew their support for the majority proposal. In an 
annotation they stated that the decision about the carbon tax should instead be left to the 
politicians. Other places in the report make it clear that these ministries in principle favor 
an across-the-board taxation. The representative of the University of Oslo gave a statement 
at the press conference on the day the report was released. He claimed that the ministry 
representatives’ sudden shift was dictated by the Prime Minister. He said, “To me it seems 
most likely that the Prime Minister has intervened” (NRK Dagsrevyen, 1995, author’s 
translation).   
At the same press conference, the leader of the commission stated that he had been 
asked to postpone the release date of the report. The request came from a meeting between 
the Prime Minister and the head of the ministries involved in the commission’s work. The 
commission leader believed the request came as a result of concerns about the contents of 
the report, most probably related to the complex natural gas issue. The Labor Party 
government had proposed the construction of two gas-fired power plants. This had caused 
a great controversy and debate, especially from the environmental movement and the 
political left wing. Electricity production in Norway is based on 99 percent hydropower, 
and a shift towards gas-fired electricity production would lead to higher emissions of CO2. 
A parliamentary decision was expected two weeks after the report’s release. There is 
therefore reason to believe that the government tried to postpone the release date because 
it feared that the recommendations of the report could swing the parliamentary vote. The 
leader of the commission called the request “a very unfortunate and unusual attempt of 
control” (NRK Dagsrevyen, 1995, author’s translation). 
The alleged intervention caused a political row and storm in the media. However, 
several days passed before Prime Minister Brundtland responded to the allegations. She 
rejected all accusations of interference in the Green Tax Commission’s work. She claimed 
that the government simply had considered giving the commission more time to look into 
the natural gas issue. The opposition obviously did not trust this version of the story, but 
still were not able to agree on a vote of no confidence towards the government (Dagens 
Næringsliv news archives, 1995). The confrontation proved that the opposition was not able 
to form a viable political alternative to the Labor government in office. 
The main message of the Green Tax Commission was a recommendation to shift 
the burden of taxation from red to green taxes. The commission presented a number of 
concrete recommendations as to how such a reform could take place. It recommended 
both new and expanded environmental taxes and cuts in subsidies that had a negative 
impact on the environment. The reception of the report generally followed the expected 
pattern. The ENGOs, the Liberal Party (V), and the Socialist Left Party (SV) were pleased 
that, despite everything else, a majority in the commission favored a green tax system, while 
business and industry interests yet again emphasized the dangers posed by environmental 
taxes to competitiveness and employment levels in cornerstone industries. 
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9 Green tax reform? 
The Green Tax Commission’s report received a great deal of attention when first released, 
but some time passed before it was followed up with proposals on tax policy reform. At 
the end of its most recent term in executive power, in 1997, the Labor Party (Ap) presented 
the case for an expanded carbon tax. In two key parliamentary reports, the Green Tax 
Commission’s proposals were presented favorably. In both reports, the carbon tax was 
promoted as the main instrument in climate policy. 
In September 1997, the parliamentary elections resulted in a new center-based 
coalition government being formed by the Christian Democratic Party (KrF), the Liberal 
Party (V), and the Center Party (Sp). As with all governments in Norway since 1986, this 
too was a minority government. The executive-legislative balance in the Norwegian 
parliamentary system gives the parliament the right to overthrow the government in the 
case of a no-confidence situation. The government, however, does not have the 
opportunity to dissolve the parliament and call for new elections. This gives the parliament 
majority a strong lever on a minority government. The center minority government 
therefore ruled more or less by the will of the opposition. At the same time it was a 
coalition and thus faced with the pitfalls of internal disagreements.     
In the fall of 1997, the departing Labor environmental minister, Thorbjørn 
Berntsen, said to the press, “The intention was that the proposal of an across-the-board 
carbon tax would be submitted in connection with a parliamentary report over the fall. The 
government has not made a final decision, but the completed presentation is with the 
Ministry of Finance. Now it is up to the new center government to follow up this work.” 
(Aftenposten news archives, 1997, author’s translation). And the new government did exactly 
that. In spring 1998, they proposed a small tax (NOK 100) on all CO2 emissions that had 
previously been exempted from environmental taxes. Out of consideration for 
competitively disadvantaged industries, however, they agreed that the tax should be fully 
compensated in the first years, after which the compensation would be gradually reduced, 
and finally phased out in 2010 at the very latest (Report. no. 29, 1997-98, and Proposal. no. 
54, 1997-98). 
Another one of the government’s proposals was to increase the tax on electricity 
without corresponding cuts in other taxes and duties. This caused a stir not only within the 
coalition, but also among the opposition and the general public because it seemed to 
counter the principle of revenue neutrality. After considerable attention from the press and 
other media, the Minister of Finance was forced to retract his statement that electricity 
taxation is primarily an income-generating tax and not an environmental tax. 
In preparing the revised national budget in the spring of 1998, the government 
openly used an expansion of the carbon tax to apply to offshore activities in order to 
balance the budget. With this, the industry lobby was able to back up its argument that 
when it came right down to it, environmental taxes were just another source of income for 
the government. It was argued that, with this, the government took a step away from using 
environmental taxes as a political instrument. However, all taxes that affect sales of goods 
and services that are directly or indirectly connected to polluting emissions will have 
environmental impacts, and effects will be green, even if the underlying motive is not. 
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10 From taxes to permits? 
Not unexpectedly, the proposal to expand carbon taxes incited a storm of protest from the 
industry lobby. The heavy industry’s national association (PIL) calculated that the tax, after 
the completion of the compensation plan, would cost up to NOK 400,000 per industrial 
employee. They protested strongly and predicted bankruptcies and re-location of export-
oriented industry abroad (Dagens Næringsliv news archives, 1998). The figures prepared by 
the Ministry of Finance for various industries, however, showed that the companies would 
keep most of their profit, even if the government’s proposal should be passed.  
This proposal to expand carbon taxes was never implemented. The Labor Party (Ap) did a 
total turn-around and, along with the conservatives  (Frp and H), stopped the proposal 
during the parliament’s preparation of the government’s scheme during summer 1998. 
Instead they proposed the introduction of a system of emission permits 3 to regulate 
untaxed CO2 emissions. The idea of an across-the-board carbon tax was thereby weakened.  
                                           
3 We have chosen to use the term ‘permit’ to denote domestic emission rights. The term ‘quota’ is used 
merely for emission rights distributed between countries. 
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11 A System of Tradable Permits ? 
The idea of emission permits and permit trading received political interest after the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
Kyoto in 1997. The COP adopted a Protocol that distributes greenhouse gas emission 
reductions, or quotas, between countries, and introduced flexibility mechanisms like quota 
trading and joint implementation as a way to implement those goals. Flexibility is a way to 
secure cost-effectiveness. The Protocol was a breakthrough for international cooperation, 
as it incorporates legally binding reduction commitments for the signatories (industrialized 
countries). However, the ratification process of the protocol is proceeding very slowly, 
causing serious doubts about whether it will ever be ratified by crucial countries like USA, 
EU, Japan, and Russia.   
 Like green taxes, a system of tradable permits is a policy instrument that has 
potential for a cost-effective outcome. Tradable emission permits will also equalize 
marginal abatement costs across sources, provided markets are perfectly competitive. The 
argument for cost effectiveness is thus an argument for emission taxes or tradable permits 
on the one hand and non-tradable permits and other types of direct regulations on the 
other hand (Hoel 1997). 
The Norwegian parliament decided to consider the consequences of a domestic 
system of tradable emission permits for greenhouse gases, and a committee was 
established. The Quota Commission released their report in December 1999. They 
recommended a system that would include all emissions suitable for regulation by permits, 
which would cover about 90 percent of Norwegian emissions of greenhouse gases. The 
majority recommended further that all sources should pay market price, in line with the 
polluter pays principle. No allocation of free permits  should occur. One part of the 
minority recommended, however, that the yet untaxed emissions should be granted free 
permits, whereas the other part believed that the issue of free permits should be left to 
politicians (NOU 2000:1). Over the next few months, the report will go through a process 
of hearings, where interest groups can present their opinions on the subject. After the 
hearings, the government will consider the recommendations made in the report. Thus, fast 
policy results cannot be expected. 
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12 Conclusions 
The issue of environmental taxes became an important aspect of Norwegian environmental 
politics in the wake of the 1987 Brundtland Report. In the course of the decade that has 
followed, however, the problems associated with the use of taxes have received increasing 
attention. The environmental taxes that have been introduced are primarily directed 
towards interest groups that do not have much influence on decision-makers, such as 
private households and the service sector. It would appear that the burden of taxation has 
been placed where it meets with the least resistance.  
In Norway today, environmental taxes seem to be a declining political instrument. 
This is contrary to recent development in other European countries such as Germany, 
Great Britain, Denmark, and Italy. In Germany, for instance, a green tax-reform was 
implemented in April 1999. There is reason to ask why the idea of a green tax reform never 
got past the starting gate in Norway. It is important to remember that the Labor (Ap) 
government never desired the establishment of a green tax commission, but accepted it as 
part of a budget compromise with the Socialist Left Party (SV). The political foundation 
for a green tax reform was therefore never in place. This has not changed after the most 
recent parliamentary elections. 
With the permit debate, Norwegian environmental policy has entered a new era. 
The resistance to environmental taxes is still great, and this is probably much of the 
explanation for the industry’s positive attitude towards a system of permits. This is in spite 
of the fact that it might imply high costs. The costs mainly depend on the firmness of the 
permits, and also whether or not they are allocated free of charge. Giving non-tradable free 
emission permits to some sources would violate cost effectiveness. It would also decrease 
the government’s revenue, revenue that could be used to lighten the burden of taxation in 
other parts of the economy.  
If a system of permits is decided upon, several years might pass before it is 
established. Most likely, this will be linked to the ratification and implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol, where the first emission reduction target period is 2008–2012. This leads 
to the question about the untaxed greenhouse gas emissions. Will they be left unregulated 
until 2008? If so, introducing a possible permit solution could be seen as part of a strategy 
to delay further emission regulations. Most likely however, the previously protected sectors 
will eventually fall under public regulation. Thus one of the most important consequences 
of the Green Tax Commission’s work is perhaps a new focus on alternative environmental 
policy instruments. Their idea of a green tax reform is easily combined with a system where 
the polluters pay market price for emission permits  and could therefore still be 
implemented.  
CICERO Report 2000:6 
From taxes to permits? The Norwegian climate policy debate 
 
 
15 
13 References 
Aftenposten’s news archives, Oslo. 
Asdal, Kristin (1998): Knappe ressurser? Økonomenes grep om miljøfeltet (Scarce resources? The economists’ grasp 
of the field of environment). Universitetsforlaget, Oslo. 
Dagens Næringsliv’s news archives, Oslo. 
Hoel, Michael (1997): Emission Taxes vs. Other Environmental Policies. Memorandum no. 13, 
Department of Economics, University of Oslo. 
Lafferty, William, M., O.S. Langhelle, P. Mugaas, M.H. Ruge (ed.) (1997): Rio + 5: Norges oppfølging 
av FN-konferansen om miljø og utvikling (Rio + 5: Norway’s follow up of the UN conference on environment 
and development). Tano Aschehoug, Oslo. 
NOU 1992:3: Mot en mer kostnadeffektiv miljøpolitikk I 1990-årene. (Towards a more cost-effective 
environmental policy in the 1990s.) 
NOU 1996: 9: Grønne skatter – en politikk for bedre miljø og høy sysselsetting. (Green taxes: A policy for a 
better environment and high rates of employment.)  
NOU 2000:1: Et kvotesystem for klimagasser. (A quota System for Climate Gases.)  
Norwegian Broadcasting Company (NRK): Daily News Report (Dagsrevyen), June 14th 1995: Press 
conference with the Green Tax Commission, Oslo. 
Proposal no. 54 to the Storting (1997–98): Grønne skatter. (Green taxes.) 
Reitan, Marit (1998): Interesser og institusjoneri miljøpolitikken (Interests and institutions in environmental 
policy). Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. 
Report no. 71 to the Storting (1972-73): Langtidsprogrammet (The cabinet’s long-term program) 
1974-1977. 
Report no. 4 to the Storting (1988–89): Langtidsprogrammet (The cabinet’s long-term program) 
1990–1993. 
Report no. 29 to the Storting (1997–98): Norges oppfølging av Kyotoprotokollen (Norway’s follow 
up of the Kyoto Protocol). 
Tenfjord, Alf-Petter (1995): CO2 –saka: Økonomisk interessepolitikk og miljøpolitiske målsetjingar (The CO2 
issue: Economic interest politics and environmental policy goals). Norwegian Research Center in 
Organization and Management, Bergen. 
 
 
 
